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This paper is an empirical analysis of two types of industry clusters: clusters that arise 
exogenously due to natural advantages, and endogenously formed clusters. The Oil and Gas 
industry was chosen as an industry that would have exogenously clustered near natural 
resources.  The Bio-Medical industry was chosen as an industry that would have clusters that 
formed endogenously.  The evidence suggests that these two industries have clusters that 
experience very different firm performance gains and losses in comparison to other non-
clustered firms in their industries.  The Oil and Gas industry has positive performance and 
growth associated with firms inside clusters.  The Bio-Medical industry has negative 
performance and growth associated with firms inside clusters. 
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1.  Introduction  
One major characteristic of industry clustering is that those firms in a cluster share information 
with each other much more readily than those outside the cluster.  Reasons for this vary but it is 
generally agreed that this tendency causes an increase in performance for those firms inside the cluster 
due to the sharing of information.  Much of the past financial research has shown this effect in general 
but does not address whether all firms and industries share this effect and to what extent the effect is 
felt by each industry.  This paper is designed to discover which industries are affected, how strongly 
industries are affected, and what firms in affected industries are influenced. 
Almazan et al., 2010, look at firms that choose their geographic location inside clusters to seek 
advantages.  This new location provides firms with an increase in shared information that avails new 
growth opportunities through acquisition over industry peers that are not located in the cluster.  Also, 
these firms have more financial slack, through lower debt ratios and larger cash holdings, to facilitate an 
increase in acquisition activity further increasing performance for in cluster firms. 
Engelberg et al., 2010, studies the efficiencies of market prices in clusters.  They find that firms 
in industry clusters tend to have higher co-movement of fundamentals versus those firms outside their 
industry cluster.  This co-movement can be explained by information sharing and leads to investors 
allocating more capital to those firms inside the clusters.  This in turn leads to lower costs of capital for 
clustered firms. 
Ellison and Glaeser, 1999, find that clusters can be categorized into two different types.  The 
first type contains those clusters that form because of a geographical natural advantage.  This natural 
advantage could be cheap energy or labor, or it could be a natural resource such as large forests.  The 
second type contains those clusters that have no apparent geographical natural advantage.  They can 
explain that at least 20% of all geographic clusters are due to natural advantage. 
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Ellison and Glaeser’s, 1999, research suggests that in order to study the effects of industry 
clustering different types of industries should be used.  An industry that relies on a natural resource 
would be used to examine one type of cluster that forms exogenously.  A second industry that does not 
require any apparent natural advantage would be used to examine another type of cluster that would 
form endogenously.  This study intends to reveal natural resource based industry firms have associated 
benefits due to cluster that differ than clustered firms in an industry without any apparent natural 
advantage.  
Clusters offer firms higher performance through better access to cheaper capital and more 
shared information.  I use Tobin’s Q as a measure of this performance.    Clusters also would allow firms 
to grow faster with access to cheaper capital and more opportunities available to them.  I use the log 
change in assets to measure this growth.  The analysis in this paper will study the associated changes of 
growth and Q within cluster firms to find what benefits clustering provide to different industries. 
I found that Oil and Gas firms see significant positive effects when considering several different 
clustering measures for both performance and growth.  Tobin’s Q increases on average by nearly 0.4 for 
all firms that have at least one other firm in their county.  Smaller clusters (2 through 5 firms) see larger 
effects while larger clusters have lower performance benefits.  Growth also sees positive effects 
averaging at about 7.9%, though this increases with cluster size instead of decreasing as performance 
does.  
Bio-Medical firms experience almost the completely opposite effect.  Those firms in the main 
cluster of Middlesex, MA have more than a 0.5 drop in Q for performance and all clusters see a drop for 
each additional firm of nearly 0.012 in Q.  Growth also has a negative effect associated with clusters.  
About 3.6% less growth is seen for firms that are in a county with at least one other cluster.  This effect 
is only significant for small clusters and large clusters do not seem to be affected.   
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When modeling clusters it is important to consider many other geographic variables that may be 
correlated with the behavior of the cluster.  Many clusters can be found in urban areas.  Do these 
clusters find that they have better access to capital and perform better because of it?  Or is it the cluster 
itself that drives the performance? 
Coval and Moskowitz, 1999, studies the effect of distance on stocks owned by each investment 
fund in the USA.  They measure the distance between the fund’s headquarters and the headquarters of 
the top ten holdings they invest in.  The distance measure used by Coval and Moskowitz, 1999, is 
created using longitudinal and latitudinal data available for each fund and each firm.  They find that fund 
managers have a strong bias for locally headquartered firms.  As such, there exists a bias for firms within 
close proximity, which in essence shows these stocks are more liquid and have more potential investors. 
Loughran and Schultz, 2005, paper studies how liquidity is different in rural versus urban firms.  
They look at how liquid a stock is based on its location, and find that urban firms stocks are more liquid 
than rural firms stocks, which results in a higher cost of equity for rural firms.  They classify a firm as 
urban if its headquarters is located in one of the ten largest metropolitan areas in the US (NYC, LA, 
Chicago, Washington-Baltimore, San Francisco, Philadelphia, Boston, Detroit, Dallas, and Houston). Also, 
a firm is considered urban if its company’s headquarters is within 100 miles from the center of any of 
the ten largest metropolitan areas.  A firm is considered rural if its company’s headquarters is more than 
100 miles from the center of any city with a population of at least 1 million.  All other firms are 
considered to be located in a small city. 
Francis et al., 2007, essentially studies the effect of geography on cost of debt.  They classify 
urban and rural similarly to Lohgran and Schultz, 2005.  They find that firms located in rural areas exhibit 
higher cost of debt as opposed to firms located in urban areas.  Their reasoning stems from rural firms 
having a higher information cost and as such are charged more for debt. 
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Using two different models for geography, either a dummy for urban firms or a direct measure 
of distance to a metropolitan area, I found that geography does have a mixed effect on the performance 
of clustered firms.  Whether a firm is located in an urban or rural setting does not seem to affect 
performance, as measured by Tobin’s Q, or growth, as measured by the log change in assets.  Also 
performance is not affected by the firm’s log distance from a metropolitan area.  However, growth is 
affected for the Oil and Gas firms via distance to their main cluster in Harris, TX.  Oil and Gas firms see a 
decrease in growth of on average 4.5% per log mile.  The Bio-Medical firms demonstrate positive growth 
on average of 0.56% as they move away from their closest metropolitan area.  Bio-Medical firms seem 
to have no significant effect from being moved away from their main cluster in Middlesex, MA. 
The remainder of the paper will be as follows.  Section 2 will outline my hypothesis.  Section 3 
will define the data being used and its selection for the experiment.  Section 4 will discuss the regression 
method used and the different variables tested.  Section 5 will analyze the results obtained from running 
the different regressions and expand with various geographic variables.  Section 6 will conclude and 
discuss future analysis. 
 
2.  Hypothesis 
The current literature on industry clustering has produced evidence that would suggest that 
firms located in clusters experience associated benefits to firm performance.  Ellison et al., 2008, 
empirically test Marshall’s theories of industrial agglomeration and find that all theories hold up to 
empirical scrutiny.  Marshall’s first theory on clustering include reductions to costs of goods from 
suppliers and to consumers due to proximity, this type of firm agglomeration would classify clusters with 
vertically integration.  Marshall’s second theory allows clustered firms to take advantage of an increased 
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supply of labor, which reduces labor costs and attracts more talent.  Marshall’s third theory suggests 
that information sharing, as well as technology spillovers are increased inside clusters, this allows 
clustered firms to become more innovative than their industry peers located outside clusters.  
Marshall’s theories and their empirical support from Ellison et al.’s, 2008, research suggest that firms 
within industry clusters would have greater firm performance than those firms located outside their 
industry clusters. 
Bell, 2005, constructs a test to separate the cluster effects on Canadian mutual fund company 
innovations due to firm location and other cluster mechanisms from innovation effects due to social 
interaction, the networking of management and laborers.  The author finds that clustered firms are 
significantly more innovative than non-clustered firms, giving evidence to support that information 
sharing is not the only cause to an increase in associated cluster innovativeness. 
Almazan et al., 2010, discuss a case where a firm adopted a strategy of aggressive acquisition, 
which ultimately led the firm to relocate its headquarters to a cluster, enabling the firm to have better 
access to opportunities and access to capital.  This story led to research examining a firms financial 
structure and acquisition activity and their relationship with a firms location, specifically whether a firms 
is within an industry cluster or not.  The authors’ found evidence that firms in clusters have more 
opportunities to make acquisitions due to their better access to information that a cluster would 
provide.  Firms in these clusters tend to have more financial slack than other firms in their industry 
allowing them to better respond to opportunities when they arise.  The authors’ suggest an association 
between a firms’ chosen capital structure choices and location.  Although, whether firms that choose to 
carry more financial slack also choose to locate in a cluster, or whether firms that have endogenously 
located in a cluster choose a capital structure with more financial slack to take advantage of increased 
acquisition opportunities is unclear. 
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The authors also find that highly urbanized areas also show similar characteristics to clusters.  If 
a firm is located in a geographic area that has increased investment opportunity, such as high-
technology and fast growing cities, then those firms will maintain more financial slack (through less 
leverage and more cash holdings).    While the increased acquisition opportunity for firms within clusters 
will lead to higher firm performance, and in particular growth, than peer firms outside of clusters, we 
should expect increased effects on a cluster located in an urbanized area.  It is important to control for 
any urbanization effects when attempting to find significant associations between clusters and firm 
performance. 
Engelberg et al., 2010, look at the effects that local investors have on the cost of capital 
discussed in papers such as Coval and Moskowitz,1999, or Loughran and Schultz,2005.  These papers 
suggest that investors have easier access to information about local firms, which makes the cost of 
information lower, and are therefore more likely to invest in them.  Engelberg et al., 2010, suggest that 
the increased sharing of information between clustered firms may be an avenue that non-local investors 
use in order to reduce costs of acquiring information about distantly clustered firms.  In order to find 
evidence of their hypothesis the authors’ study the co-movements of investments, earning and other 
fundamentals inside industries.  Their research supports that co-movement of fundamentals with an 
industry is stronger for those firms inside than other firms outside clusters.  Also, the authors’ found 
that investors have lower costs in gathering information about firms located inside a cluster.  As a result, 
investors will be more likely to invest in clustered firms due to their lower cost, rather than outside 
cluster firms which would have a higher associated cost of information.  This is reflected in their finding 
that fund managers have a tendency to make up a larger portion of their portfolios with firms within an 
industry cluster.  Similarly, analysts tend to cover firms within an industry cluster more often due to the 
lower cost to investigate each additional within the cluster.  This leads to firms within industry clusters 
having slower price delay when industry information is revealed.  The authors’ findings should allow 
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clustered firms to have more access to capital for acquisitions, private ventures, or new projects, all of 
which would benefit growth and performance.  
The above arguments would suggest that firms located in clusters will have greater firm 
performance than other non-clustered firms in their industries.  It is important to note that firms located 
in urban areas or close to financial centers have also experienced increases to firm performance over 
their industry peers.  In order to test the robustness of clustering significance, controls for geographic 
urbanization will need to be used. 
We learn from Ellison and Glaeser’s, 1999, finding that cluster form in geographic locations for 
different reasons.  Firm agglomeration has been previously attributed to industry spillovers and 
endogenous growth. The authors’ suggest that some industries have firms that may exogenously choose 
their location if a particular geographic area allows that firm access to a natural advantage.  These 
natural advantages may be lower costs of electricity or labor, but they can also be more directly related 
to natural resources.  Other industries have endogenously chosen firm locations and cluster for different 
reasons.  In their paper, the authors’ investigate industry concentration at the state geographic level and 
look at a set of 16 natural advantage interactions.  They find the best and worst states for several 
industries (based on the 4 digit SIC codes), and compare those with their state level industry 
concentrations.  Ellison and Glaeser, 1999, conclude that about 20% of industry clusters are explained by 
their set of natural advantage.  They also conclude cases of clustering that cannot be explained by any 
natural advantage and must be a result of endogenous occurrences. 
The research done by Ellison and Glaeser, 1999, indicates that there are at least two major types 
of clusters, those that exogenously choose a natural advantage and those that have endogenously 
chosen locations.  Industries that rely on access to natural resources are arguably the most obvious case 
of firms exogenously choosing a geographic natural advantage.  We might expect that clusters in these 
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industries form for very specific reasons and should experience high firm performance relative to non 
clustered firms.  Industries where clusters form endogenously should have lower, non-negative, 
associated firm performance benefits due to clustering over non clustered firms when compared to firm 
performance benefits found in clusters from industries reliant on natural resources. 
Give the above argument we might hypothesis that firms in industries with no apparent natural 
advantage will have lower performance and growth benefits than those firms in industries dependent 
on natural resources.  This requires that any benefits that firms have within clusters will be similar 
enough across industries such that the effect of an access to natural advantages can be measured by 
significant changes in firm performance. 
 
3.  Sample Selection 
Data was gathered from Compustat for all active U.S. firms from 1995-2009 in the oil and gas 
extraction industry and bio-medical industry.  The oil and gas industry is defined as all firms that are 
given 3-digit NAICS classification 211, and was chosen as an example of an industry that has the 
tendency to cluster around a natural resource.  The bio-medical industry is defined as all firms that are 
given 4-digit NAICS classification 3254 (Pharmaceutical and Medicine Manufacturing) and 3391 (Medical 
Equipment and Supplies Manufacturing) as well as NAICS 541711 (Research and Development in 
Biotechnology), and was chosen as an example of an industry that is less likely to rely on a natural 
resource or other natural advantage. 
Observations were dropped if no county and state pair or zip code existed.  In order to complete 
the datasets, for any observation that had a missing county and/or state but an existing zip code, the 
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county and state were hand populated.  Information for the zip code to county and state data came 
from Zip Express software at www.getzips.com. 
If sales, and book value of total equity were less than 0 or didn’t exist the observation was 
dropped.  Observations were dropped if total assets were less than 5 or didn’t exist.  The resulting 
dataset can be seen in tables 1 and 2 for the Oil and Gas Extraction firms and the Bio-Medical firms 
respectively.  The top ten largest clusters are shown with their count of firms for each year as well as the 
remaining counties totals. 
R&D expenditures were set to 0 if the observation had a non-existent value.  R&D expenditures 
were only used in the Bio-Medical industry data.  Less than 2% of Oil and Gas firms reported R&D 
expenditures in compustat, and so this could not be used as an explanatory variable. 
Since geography was also modeled, two variables were created that used similar methods to 
Coval  and Moskowitz, 1999, as well as Loughran and Schultz, 2005.  Distance variables were generated 
for the top ten largest cities according to the 2000 census (New York City, Los Angeles, Chicago, 
Washington- Baltimore, San Francisco, Philadelphia, Boston, Detroit, Dallas, and Houston).  The distance 
variables are a measure in miles to from a firm to the center of each of the cities.  An eleventh distance 
variable was created that represented the distance to a firm’s closest metropolitan area.  An urban 
dummy was generated by selecting all firms within 100 miles of the top ten largest city centers. 
 
4.  Model  
In orderto estimate the effect of clustering of Tobin’s Q I run OLS resgressions of the following 
kind: 
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Where Q is common shares outstanding times the observation year stock price added to total 
assets and subtracted by common equity all over total assets.  Size is the log of assets.  Leverage is total 
liabilities over total assets.  PPE stands for plant, property, and equipment.  R&D stands for research and 
development expenditures.  CapX stands for capital expenditures.  Also, I included a dummy for R&D 
expenditures equal to 0 in order to control for the average effect of firms with missing values.  Year fixed 
effects and industry fixed effects, denoted by δt and γj respectively, were also included in the model in 
the form of year and NAICS code dummies.  All variables were winsorized at 5% and independent 
variables were lagged one year with respect to Q.  R&D was dropped from the Oil and Gas regressions 
on Q due to the high number of missing values.  Estimated standard errors, denoted εi,j,t, are robust to 
firm level clustering. 
Growth was modeled to look at another aspect of firm performance with the following 
regression: 
                                                    
            
                 
     
        
                 
                                                   
Where growth is log change in total assets. Industry Q is the median Q for the industry by NAISC.  
All variables except industry Q were winsorized at 5%.  R&D was dropped from the Oil and Gas 
regressions on growth due to the high number of missing values.  
For both the growth and performance regressions several methods of measuring clustering 
were included.  Clust was generated as a dummy that indicated a firm was located in its largest industry 
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cluster, Harris, TX for the Oil and Gas Extraction industry and Middlesex, MA for the Bio-Medical 
industry.  The Bio-Medical industry did not have a single cluster that was significantly larger than all 
other clusters in the industry as in the Oil and Gas industry.  Clust0 is a dummy only for the Bio-Medical 
industry and was generated to include firms that were either in Middlesex, MA or San Diego, CA 
counties.  Clustcount was generated as the number of firms in each county per year.  Logcount is the log 
of cluster size represented by clustcount.  Localcom was generated as a dummy the included all counties 
with at least 2 firms, this dummy is used to capture counties that contained firms with any local 
competition.  Clust1 was generated as a dummy that included all small cluster counties of 2 through 5 
firms.  Clust2 was generated as a dummy to include larger cluster counties of more than 5 firms.  These 
different measurements of clustering were used in order to determine how large clusters need to be 
before they have any effect and if the effects increase linearly, logarithmically, or not all with size. 
In order to control for any geographic effect on firms located close to highly urbanized areas the 
distance from each firm to the center of the top ten largest cities according to the 2000 census was 
calculated (New York City, Los Angeles, Chicago, Washington- Baltimore, San Francisco, Philadelphia, 
Boston, Detroit, Dallas, and Houston).  The variable ldist was generated as the log distance to the closest 
city for each firm, this represents the closest financial center to the firm.  Two other distance variables 
were generated, ldisthous, the log distance to Houston, and ldistbost, the log distance to Boston, this 
represents the distance each firm is from their largest cluster. 
 
5.  Results 
The first set of regressions for Oil and Gas showed significant positive effects for performance, 
Tobin’s Q, and the results can be found in table 5.  The clustering dummies localcom, clust1, and clust2 
all had significant positive results.  Clust had no significant results as well as the two continuous 
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measures of cluster size, clustcount and logclust.  This suggests that competition creates a significant 
increase in performance of 0.397 in Q for the Oil and Gas industry, a relatively large increase given that 
the median industy Q is 1.565.  We do see a declining effect on performance with the size clusters.  
Small clusters represented by clust1 have the highest performance increase of 0.477 in Q.  Larger 
clusters, represented by clust 2 and clust 4, have less positive effects of 0.358 and 0.386 respectively.  
So, while there is a decrease in performance gained if the number of firms in a cluster increases 
significantly, the addition of one extra firm seems to have little effect on a cluster, due to the non-result 
of the continuous cluster size variables. 
The firm growth of the Oil and Gas Industry shows significant in table 7 for continuous clustering 
variables clustcount and logcount as well as clustering dummies localcom, clust1, and clust2.  Having 
competition reveals that firms tend to grow about 7.9% faster than those firms that are alone in their 
own county.  We also see that firms grow faster if they are in larger clusters.  The firms in clusters with 
more than 10 firms experience 8.2% faster growth rate, while small clusters experience 5.9% increase in 
growth rate.  The growth of firms can be seen with small changes in cluster size as well.  For each 
additional firm added to a cluster, other firms gain 0.12% increase in growth.  On the log scale this 
growth increase is nearly 1%. 
The Bio-Medical firms, however, saw significant negative effects of clustering on performance in 
table 6.  The clustering dummies clust and clust0 as well as continuous clustering variables clustcount 
and logcount had significant negative coefficients in performance.  Clust1 and clust2 were not found to 
be significant explanatory variables for Q in Bio-Medical firms.  Firms in Middlesex, MA had an 
associated Q that was 0.522 less than that of other Bio-Medical firms, where median industry Q is 3.142.  
The addition of the second largest cluster, San Diego, CA, increased the association to 0.315 less than 
other firms for Q.  For the continuous variables, the linear addition of each new firm to a cluster will 
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effectively lower Q for the whole cluster by 0.012.  The significance of the number of firms is also robust 
to being measured by log form. 
The Bio-Medical firms also experienced significant negative associations between clusters and 
growth in table 8.  As long as there are competitors in a single county, those firms experience a 
reduction in growth of 3.6% compared to those firms in counties with no competitors.  This seems to be 
driven mainly by the small clusters.  Small clusters experience associated growth losses of 4.5% while 
any loss that is seen in larger clusters is not significant. 
It is surprising to find such opposite results for the Oil and Gas Extraction and Bio-Medical 
industries.  When considering how these two industries might differ in acquisition strategies, there 
might be a plausible answer.  According to Almazan et al., 2010, Oil and Gas firms may locate in clusters 
to have better access to information regarding opportunities for acquisition.  If this is the case then we 
should expect larger clusters to have the best access to information, and information to reduce as 
clusters get smaller.  This is what is found in the results.  The largest clusters have the highest associated 
growth, and this growth decreases with cluster size. 
In contrast to the Oil and Gas industry, I found that only small clusters were affected in the Bio-
Medical industry, with a decrease in growth, though the larger clusters had no significant negative 
associations.  Many of these public Bio-Medical firms may behave similar to those found in Oil and Gas 
firms, in that they tend to buy up small startup private firms.  However, unlike natural resource based 
firms, the Bio-Medical industry may be more likely to acquire ideas and patents.  If this is the case the 
then small counties with very few firms may see nearly no private ventures and acquiring those that do 
exist is may be a matter of being quicker than competitor when making an offer.  Larger clusters, like 
Middlesex, MA or San Diego, CA, have dozens of firms in their counties and may see a higher ratio of 
startup opportunities.  If so, then firms in larger clusters can more easily “miss” bidding on one 
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opportunity with little effect since others are quick to follow.  This would likely lead to two separate 
approaches to acquisition.  Small clusters must quickly bid on opportunities, leading to smaller (and 
more risky) acquisitions.  Larger clusters have the option of viewing multiple opportunities, waiting, and 
bidding on the best ones, leading to larger (and less risky) acquisitions. 
Another possible explanation for the difference between the two industries may lie in the labor 
that they rely on.  Bio-Medical firms tend to be located predominantly in high-tech areas and require the 
particularly highly educated individuals to produce new medicines, devices, or procedures, all of which 
require a large amount of research.  The startup of a new venture in the Bio-Medical industry requires a 
team of dedicated and highly educated researchers to develop new patents or processes that would 
benefit the industry.  It is uncertain whether those startups also require a large sum of capital in order to 
achieve any market value.  As such, in clusters where we expect to find a greater number of skilled 
laborers and more information exchange we should also expect that these skilled laborers might also be 
more likely to cooperate in new startups.  Whatever ideas that these startups develop will likely be 
gathered through acquisition by larger firms in the cluster.  The price of purchasing those ideas may be 
relatively higher than the cost of a firm producing the same idea in house.  Therefore, it would be in the 
best interest of the Bio-Medical firms to retain their skilled researcher instead of acquiring their ideas on 
the market.  The skilled laborers and researchers may then extract rents on firms to keep them 
employed.  In other words, a researcher for a firm within a cluster may be compensated with a higher 
salary so the risk of seeking private venture looks less appealing.  Researchers in firms outside of clusters 
may be less likely to establish private startups due to lower information exchange between firms leading 
to less extracted rents by employees.  These rents could explain in part the negative associating we see 
with clustered firms in the Bio-Medical industry. 
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The Oil and Gas industry should not be affected by an increased cost of labor as the Bio-Medical 
industry may likely be.  The assets purchased in the Oil and Gas industry are much more tangible and 
transparent.  We might expect that most new ventures require not only the team of skilled laborers but 
also a large amount of capital.  Any new ideas developed by researchers are more likely to require 
expensive equipment and access to a natural resource to implement.  This is very different than startups 
in the Bio-Medical industry.  As such, we might expect that the new ventures in the Oil and Gas industry 
are much more difficult and expensive relative to the Bio-Medical industry and are therefore less likely 
to occur.  As a result the skilled researchers and laborers in the Oil and Gas industry cannot extract rents 
from the firms and there is no change from the expected clustering associations. 
A third explanation in the results may be competition for labor in the clusters.  It might be the 
case that the Bio-Medical industry cannot support large clusters, while the Oil and Gas extraction 
industry can.  If there is plenty of labor in the major clusters of the Oil and Gas industry, such that the 
laborers cannot extract rents and no projects or ventures need additional labor, then there would be 
none of the negative effects as seen in the Bio-Medical industry.  Any of these explanations may have 
some part in the results uncovered by this paper’s research, however without additional research they 
are all speculation. 
I next introduced the distance variables and urban dummy to determine the robustness of my 
findings.  The urban dummy, where firms are considered urban if they headquartered within 100 miles 
of one of the top ten largest U.S. cities, was not significant in any of the performance or growth 
regressions for the Oil and Gas Extraction and Bio-Medical industries, results are in tables 9 through 12.  
There was little effect of including the urban dummy on previously significant clustering variables, two 
variables did lose significance however.  The positive associated growth in small clusters lost significance 
for Oil and Gas firms.  Since we find only 15 urban observations in the larger clusters most of the other 
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urban observations would be singleton or small clusters counties.  The addition of the urban dummy 
may be splitting the effect of small clusters resulting in the loss of significance.  The negative associated 
loss in Q for the log of cluster size lost significance for Bio-Medical firms.  This is likely to indicate that 
the effect of cluster size on Q is truly linear. 
Unlike the urban dummies, some of the log of distance variables did enter significant in growth 
regressions.  In table 15 for the Oil and Gas firms, the distance to Houston had a significant negative 
association while the distance to a firms closest top ten city was not significant.  This indicates that it is 
important to be closer to the information that the largest cluster in Harris, TX would provide rather than 
having the best access to capital that the closest financial center would provide.  Significance is lost in 
small clusters here as well.  I believe that we can attribute this loss to the addition of ldist, which would 
capture some of the effect of most of the small clusters leaving both ldist and small clusters insignificant. 
I find that the growth of Bio-Medical firms, in table 16, experienced no significance from the 
distance to their largest cluster city of Boston, but a positive significant association with a firm’s distance 
to its closest financial center.  If the acquisition argument is correct we should expect this.  With more 
access to capital associated with firms being located near to financial centers, more private ventures 
would occur.  As such we would expect that small clusters located close to financial centers would see 
higher growth than those small clusters further away for the same argument that the largest clusters 
would have higher growth.  More acquisition opportunities should lead small clusters to wait longer and 
bid on less risky (and larger) assets. 
The log of the distance variables are not significant in the Q regressions, results in tables 13 and 
14.  In the Oil and Gas firms the larger cluster significance was lost, likely due to spitting the effect 
between larger clusters and the distance to Houston variable.  All clustering variables lost significance 
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for the Bio-Medical firms, also likely due to the majority of firms being located near one of the top ten 
largest cities and the effect of clustering being too finely split among those ten cities. 
 
6.  Conclusion 
The results of the experiment found that the hypothesis that firms within clusters have greater 
firm performance than their industry peers outside clusters. fails.  The Oil and Gas Extraction industry 
certainly had higher associated firm performance in clustered firms.  However, the Bio-Medical industry 
had lower associated firm performance in clustered firms.  While other papers have found that in 
general we see higher firm performance in clusters, not every industry follows that hypothesis.  
Therefore, the evidence rejects the first hypothesis. 
The results of the experiment found that hypothesis 2 holds.  Considering that the Oil and Gas 
Extraction industry had positive associated benefits to firm performance in clusters, while the Bio-
Medical industry had negative associated benefits, we can easily confirm that an industry with no 
natural advantage has lower firm performance than an industry dependent on a natural resource.  
These results give us insight into different cluster types but do not directly answer the question posed.  
Therefore, the evidence fails to reject the second hypothesis. 
The evidence that led to the failure to reject the second hypothesis allows me to pose two more 
hypotheses for future research.  First is that firms located inside clusters will have higher performance 
and growth than firms outside of clusters in industries that have exogenously chosen to cluster near 
natural advantages.  While the evidence from the regressions performed on the Oil and Gas Extraction 
industry suggest that this is true a complete empirical analysis must be done on the entire set of U.S. 
firms to give more robust evidence as to whether or not the hypothesis is true.  A second hypothesis is 
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that firms inside clusters will have lower performance and growth than firms outside of clusters in 
industries that have endogenously formed clusters.  Similarly, the results from regressions of firm 
performance in the Bio-Medical industry suggest the hypothesis to be true a more robust empirical 
analysis which includes a complete set of firms is required. 
If these new hypotheses stand up to future research scrutiny it is important to ask why we see 
the different firm performance in these two types of clusters.  In the analysis section I suggested that 
acquisition strategies might play a role in the results that I found.  It would be important to construct a 
test to verify that explanation.  To do this the total number of establishments, including private firms, 
would be required.  I also suggest that the labor required by the two industries could be the driving 
force behind the observed firm performance differences.  This explanation must also be tested through 
a look at labor markets available near clusters versus labor markets outside clusters. 
To expand the research done in this paper and add further robustness to the results, clusters 
could be defined in other ways as well.  A count of private firms established in the counties of interest 
may provide further insight into cluster sizes and their effects.  Also this study looked specifically at 
single industries as clusters.  Many industries have vertical associations between suppliers and buyers.  
Expanding the concept of a cluster to include vertically associated industries should provide evidence of 
more powerful associated benefits and detriments. 
The findings in this paper bring into question whether or not current literature should be 
treating all clusters equally.  My results suggest that more research is required to fully identify clustering 
effects.  Previous general results about the effects of clustering should be reassessed to take into 
account better cluster identification and cluster types. 
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Appendix: 
Table 1:  Oil and Gas Extraction Summary Statistics 
W5_Q - Tobin’s Q winsorized at 5%.  W5_growth - log change of assets winsorized at 5%.  W5_size - log of total 
assets winsorized at 5%.  W5_lev – leverage is given by total liabilities over total assets and winsorized at 5%.  
W5_ppent_s - net property, plant, and equipment adjusted for sizes by dividing by total assets and winsorized at 
5%.  W5_capx_s - capital expenditures adjusted for sizes by dividing by total assets and winsorized at 5%. 
 
Observations Outside Oil and Gas Cluster Harris, TX 
 
Obs Mean Std. Dev. 
w5_Q 954 1.819002 1.023332 
w5_growth 928 0.1931488 0.3321545 
w5_size 1064 5.050449 2.09867 
w5_ppent_s 1057 0.7218559 0.203971 
w5_capx_s 1045 0.2029241 0.1496617 
w5_lev 1064 0.4836167 0.2530221 
 Observations Inside Oil and Gas Cluster Harris, TX 
 
Obs Mean Std. Dev. 
w5_Q 436 1.880164 1.178013 
w5_growth 431 0.2159359 0.3500212 
w5_size 492 5.659477 2.047642 
w5_ppent_s 492 0.7370523 0.218113 
w5_capx_s 492 0.221093 0.1614349 
w5_lev 492 0.5250471 0.2605465 
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Table 2:  Oil and Gas Extraction Firm-Year Observations 
This table includes the number of firm observations for each year in the dataset for the oil and gas industry (NAICS 
211).  Listed are the five largest (by number of firm-year observations) counties that have firms in the oil and gas 
industry as well as a sum of all remaining 44 counties that are in the dataset. 
 
 
Data Year 
County, State 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 Total 
Harris, TX 17 21 20 21 23 26 27 29 32 38 45 47 47 52 47 492 
Denver, CO 7 7 7 7 7 10 12 12 15 18 19 20 21 18 17 197 
Oklahoma, OK 5 5 5 5 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 9 9 10 11 108 
Dallas, TX 1 1 1 2 3 2 5 4 4 5 8 10 10 9 10 75 
Tarrant, TX 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 47 
Tulsa, OK 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 41 
Collin, TX 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 35 
Midland, TX 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 4 4 4 4 3 34 
Delaware, PA 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 32 
New York, NY 0 0 0 1 2 2 2 3 3 2 2 2 2 4 4 29 
Remaining 19 21 21 23 26 25 27 26 33 38 45 41 43 43 35 466 
Total 57 64 62 68 78 82 91 93 107 122 143 147 149 153 140 1,556 
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Table 3:  Bio-Medical Summary Statistics 
W5_Q - Tobin’s Q winsorized at 5%.  W5_growth - log change of assets winsorized at 5%.  W5_size - log of total 
assets winsorized at 5%.  W5_size - log of total assets winsorized at 5%.  W5_lev – leverage is given by total 
liabilities over total assets and winsorized at 5%.  W5_ppent_s - net property, plant, and equipment adjusted for 
sizes by dividing by total assets and winsorized at 5%.  W5_capx_s - capital expenditures adjusted for sizes by 
dividing by total assets and winsorized at 5%. 
 
Observations Outside Bio-Medical Cluster Middlesex, MA 
 
Obs Mean Std. Dev. 
w5_Q 4081 3.428033 2.317547 
w5_growth 3869 0.0996005 0.4069862 
w5_size 4465 4.182921 1.698706 
w5_ppent_s 4432 0.1471055 0.1339852 
w5_capx_s 4429 0.0351224 0.0360482 
w5_lev 4444 0.4013019 0.3140265 
 Observations Inside Bio-Medical Cluster Middlesex, MA 
 
Obs Mean Std. Dev. 
w5_Q 405 3.256795 2.061109 
w5_growth 399 0.1075062 0.4617278 
w5_size 450 4.363919 1.592585 
w5_ppent_s 450 0.1261739 0.1165356 
w5_capx_s 450 0.0326464 0.0339852 
w5_lev 449 0.3914538 0.3066062 
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Table 4:  Bio-Medical Firm-Year Observations 
This table includes the number of firm observations for each year in the dataset for the bio-medical industry 
(NAICS 3254, 3391, and 541711).  Listed are the five largest (by number of firm-year observations) counties that 
have firms in the bio-medical industry as well as a sum of all remaining 146 counties that are in the dataset. 
 
 
Data Year 
County, State 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 Total 
Middlesex, MA 16 20 22 23 24 26 27 29 34 37 38 40 41 40 33 450 
San Diego, CA 10 12 13 16 17 17 18 25 25 33 36 37 37 39 37 372 
San Mateo, CA 3 4 4 9 11 11 12 16 18 21 23 25 25 23 22 227 
Alameda, CA 9 10 11 10 12 12 13 12 11 12 12 12 15 15 16 182 
Orange, CA 6 11 11 11 10 13 14 10 11 13 12 12 15 13 10 172 
New York, NY 7 7 9 9 7 9 7 7 11 14 14 13 15 13 13 155 
Santa Clara, CA 3 4 4 7 7 7 7 7 8 11 14 14 13 15 15 136 
Chester, PA 3 5 6 7 8 8 8 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 125 
Los Angeles, CA 5 5 6 7 8 9 8 8 9 11 11 9 8 9 8 121 
Montgomery, MD 4 4 4 5 5 6 6 7 7 10 11 12 14 13 12 120 
Remaining, 146 108 132 143 158 166 175 180 191 196 211 225 245 257 248 220 2855 
Total 174 214 233 262 275 293 300 322 340 383 406 429 450 438 396 4915 
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Table 5:  Tobin’s Q Regression Output for Oil and Gas Extraction Data 
Tobin’s Q is stepped forward one period with respect to all explanatory variables in each regression and winsorized 
at 5%.  Clust - dummy equals 1 if a firm is inside the cluster, the cluster for the oil and gas firms is the county 
Harris, TX.  Clustcount - the number of firms in the observation’s cluster.  Logcount - this is the log of clustcount, a 
0 value indicates the observation is the only one in that county.  Localcom - dummy equals 1 if there is at least one 
other firm in the county.  Clust1 - dummy equals 1 if there are 2 through 5 firms in the county.  Clust2 - dummy 
equals 1 if there are more than 5 firms in the county.  W5_size - log of total assets winsorized at 5%.  W5_lev – 
leverage is given by total liabilities over total assets and winsorized at 5%.  W5_ppent_s - net property, plant, and 
equipment adjusted for sizes by dividing by total assets and winsorized at 5%.  W5_capx_s - capital expenditures 
adjusted for sizes by dividing by total assets and winsorized at 5%. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES F.w5_Q F.w5_Q F.w5_Q F.w5_Q F.w5_Q 
clust 0.138     
 (0.140)     
clustcount  0.00463    
  (0.00394)    
logcount   0.0644   
   (0.0443)   
localcom    0.397***  
    (0.129)  
clust1     0.474** 
     (0.182) 
clust2     0.358*** 
     (0.129) 
w5_size -0.129*** -0.130*** -0.133*** -0.137*** -0.136*** 
 (0.0332) (0.0333) (0.0337) (0.0342) (0.0341) 
w5_lev 0.0425 0.0505 0.0611 0.0684 0.0570 
 (0.200) (0.201) (0.202) (0.195) (0.195) 
w5_ppent_s -0.412 -0.415 -0.430 -0.441 -0.433 
 (0.327) (0.328) (0.329) (0.326) (0.314) 
w5_capx_s 0.641* 0.624* 0.608* 0.555* 0.568* 
 (0.331) (0.331) (0.329) (0.325) (0.329) 
Constant 2.557*** 2.566*** 2.532*** 2.395*** 2.393*** 
 (0.366) (0.365) (0.370) (0.324) (0.315) 
      
Observations 1234 1234 1234 1234 1234 
R-squared 0.163 0.165 0.167 0.183 0.185 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6:  Tobin’s Q Regression Output for Bio-Medical Data 
Tobin’s Q is stepped forward one period with respect to all explanatory variables in each regression and winsorized 
at 5%.  Clust - dummy equals 1 if a firm is inside the cluster, the cluster for the Bio-Medical firms is the county 
Middlesex, MA.  Clust0 - dummy equals 1 if a firm is in clust or in the San Diego, CA cluster.  Clustcount - the 
number of firms in the observation’s cluster.  Logcount - this is the log of clustcount, a 0 value indicates the 
observation is the only one in that county.  Localcom - dummy equals 1 if there is at least one other firm in the 
county.  Clust1 - dummy equals 1 if there are 2 through 5 firms in the county.  Clust2 - dummy equals 1 if there are 
more than 5 firms in the county.  W5_size - log of total assets winsorized at 5%.  W5_lev – leverage is given by total 
liabilities over total assets and winsorized at 5%.  W5_ppent_s - net property, plant, and equipment adjusted for 
sizes by dividing by total assets and winsorized at 5%.  W5_capx_s - capital expenditures adjusted for sizes by 
dividing by total assets and winsorized at 5%. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES F.w5_Q F.w5_Q F.w5_Q F.w5_Q F.w5_Q F.w5_Q 
clust -0.522***      
 (0.166)      
clust0  -0.315**     
  (0.144)     
clustcount   -0.0118**    
   (0.00463)    
logcount    -0.0996**   
    (0.0497)   
localcom     -0.00781  
     (0.150)  
clust1      0.161 
      (0.167) 
clust2      -0.153 
      (0.160) 
w5_size -0.0747* -0.0755* -0.0731* -0.0751* -0.0800* -0.0706* 
 (0.0407) (0.0408) (0.0410) (0.0410) (0.0408) (0.0408) 
w5_lev 0.726*** 0.716*** 0.709*** 0.708*** 0.723*** 0.710*** 
 (0.185) (0.187) (0.186) (0.186) (0.187) (0.184) 
w5_ppent_s -2.158*** -2.178*** -2.250*** -2.274*** -2.141*** -2.232*** 
 (0.478) (0.479) (0.476) (0.480) (0.479) (0.476) 
w5_xrd_s 2.409*** 2.423*** 2.470*** 2.478*** 2.382*** 2.442*** 
 (0.268) (0.268) (0.271) (0.272) (0.269) (0.267) 
rd_dummy 0.535** 0.529** 0.530** 0.511** 0.502** 0.516** 
 (0.215) (0.213) (0.211) (0.211) (0.213) (0.208) 
w5_capx_s 5.538*** 5.552*** 5.563*** 5.554*** 5.509*** 5.455*** 
 (1.415) (1.417) (1.417) (1.419) (1.421) (1.421) 
Constant 2.775*** 2.788*** 2.795*** 2.893*** 2.827*** 2.736*** 
 (0.655) (0.654) (0.652) (0.658) (0.655) (0.627) 
       
Observations 3990 3990 3984 3984 3990 3990 
R-squared 0.194 0.192 0.192 0.191 0.189 0.193 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 7:  Asset Growth Regression Output for Oil and Gas Extraction Data 
Asset growth is winsorized at 5%.  Clust - dummy equals 1 if a firm is inside the cluster, the cluster for the oil and 
gas firms is the county Harris, TX.  Clustcount - the number of firms in the observation’s cluster.  Logcount - this is 
the log of clustcount, a 0 value indicates the observation is the only one in that county.  Localcom - dummy equals 
1 if there is at least one other firm in the county.  Clust1 - dummy equals 1 if there are 2 through 5 firms in the 
county.  Clust2 - dummy equals 1 if there are more than 5 firms in the county.  W5_size - log of total assets 
winsorized at 5%.  W5_lev – leverage is given by total liabilities over total assets and winsorized at 5%.  
W5_ppent_s - net property, plant, and equipment adjusted for sizes by dividing by total assets and winsorized at 
5%.  W5_capx_s - capital expenditures adjusted for sizes by dividing by total assets and winsorized at 5%.  IndQ - 
median Tobin’s Q for each NAICS. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES w5_growth w5_growth w5_growth w5_growth w5_growth 
clust 0.0291     
 (0.0228)     
clustcount  0.00123**    
  (0.000621)    
logcount   0.0198**   
   (0.00767)   
localcom    0.0788***  
    (0.0272)  
clust1     0.0584* 
     (0.0296) 
clust2     0.0883*** 
     (0.0287) 
w5_size -0.00605 -0.00644 -0.00711 -0.00727 -0.00744 
 (0.00583) (0.00588) (0.00589) (0.00571) (0.00576) 
w5_lev -0.0718 -0.0703 -0.0675 -0.0674 -0.0651 
 (0.0516) (0.0514) (0.0512) (0.0504) (0.0506) 
w5_ppent_s 0.0952 0.0928 0.0856 0.0843 0.0807 
 (0.0607) (0.0609) (0.0614) (0.0611) (0.0615) 
indQ 0.118 0.123 0.113 0.111 0.109 
 (0.373) (0.376) (0.375) (0.374) (0.375) 
Constant 0.0956 0.0900 0.0924 0.0727 0.0767 
 (0.514) (0.519) (0.517) (0.516) (0.517) 
      
Observations 1352 1352 1352 1352 1352 
R-squared 0.147 0.150 0.152 0.154 0.155 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 8:  Asset Growth Regression Output for Bio-Medical Data 
Asset growth is winsorized at 5%.  Clust - dummy equals 1 if a firm is inside the cluster, the cluster for the Bio-
Medical firms is the county Middlesex, MA.  Clust0 - dummy equals 1 if a firm is in clust or in the San Diego, CA 
cluster.  Clustcount - the number of firms in the observation’s cluster.  Logcount - this is the log of clustcount, a 0 
value indicates the observation is the only one in that county.  Localcom - dummy equals 1 if there is at least one 
other firm in the county.  Clust1 - dummy equals 1 if there are 2 through 5 firms in the county.  Clust2 - dummy 
equals 1 if there are more than 5 firms in the county.  W5_size - log of total assets winsorized at 5%.  W5_lev – 
leverage is given by total liabilities over total assets and winsorized at 5%.  W5_ppent_s - net property, plant, and 
equipment adjusted for sizes by dividing by total assets and winsorized at 5%.  W5_capx_s - capital expenditures 
adjusted for sizes by dividing by total assets and winsorized at 5%.  IndQ - median Tobin’s Q for each NAICS. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES w5_growth w5_growth w5_growth w5_growth w5_growth w5_growth 
clust 0.00336      
 (0.0259)      
clust0  0.00694     
  (0.0194)     
clustcount   -0.000332    
   (0.000685)    
logcount    -0.00501   
    (0.00650)   
localcom     -0.0360*  
     (0.0186)  
clust1      -0.0450** 
      (0.0206) 
clust2      -0.0282 
      (0.0199) 
w5_size -0.00748* -0.00754* -0.00723* -0.00717* -0.00773* -0.00823** 
 (0.00394) (0.00395) (0.00395) (0.00395) (0.00403) (0.00395) 
w5_lev 0.0317 0.0318 0.0313 0.0309 0.0305 0.0315 
 (0.0270) (0.0269) (0.0270) (0.0270) (0.0271) (0.0269) 
w5_ppent_s 0.196*** 0.196*** 0.193*** 0.189*** 0.183*** 0.188*** 
 (0.0567) (0.0571) (0.0576) (0.0582) (0.0573) (0.0588) 
w5_xrd_s 0.198*** 0.198*** 0.200*** 0.203*** 0.208*** 0.205*** 
 (0.0368) (0.0370) (0.0373) (0.0369) (0.0370) (0.0367) 
rd_dummy -0.0467* -0.0471* -0.0461* -0.0464* -0.0480* -0.0489* 
 (0.0261) (0.0261) (0.0261) (0.0260) (0.0260) (0.0264) 
indQ 0.0417** 0.0417** 0.0419** 0.0419** 0.0424** 0.0427** 
 (0.0188) (0.0188) (0.0188) (0.0188) (0.0188) (0.0188) 
Constant 0.0466 0.0472 0.0457 0.0500 0.0738 0.0769 
 (0.0791) (0.0790) (0.0790) (0.0792) (0.0789) (0.0792) 
       
Observations 4216 4216 4210 4210 4216 4216 
R-squared 0.085 0.085 0.085 0.085 0.086 0.086 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 9:  Tobin’s Q Regression Output for Oil and Gas Extraction Data with Urban Dummy 
Tobin’s Q is stepped forward one period with respect to all explanatory variables in each regression and winsorized 
at 5%.  Localcom - dummy equals 1 if there is at least one other firm in the county.  Clust1 - dummy equals 1 if 
there are 2 through 5 firms in the county.  Clust2 - dummy equals 1 if there are more than 5 firms in the county.  
Urb – dummy equal 1 if firm is urban.  W5_size - log of total assets winsorized at 5%.  W5_lev – leverage is given by 
total liabilities over total assets and winsorized at 5%.  W5_ppent_s - net property, plant, and equipment adjusted 
for sizes by dividing by total assets and winsorized at 5%.  W5_capx_s - capital expenditures adjusted for sizes by 
dividing by total assets and winsorized at 5%. 
 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES F.w5_Q F.w5_Q 
   
localcom 0.300**  
 (0.148)  
clust1  0.460** 
  (0.216) 
clust2  0.213 
  (0.131) 
Urb -0.0543 -0.0354 
 (0.141) (0.130) 
w5_size -0.109*** -0.107*** 
 (0.0296) (0.0289) 
w5_lev -0.244 -0.299 
 (0.249) (0.241) 
w5_ppent_s -0.0305 0.00932 
 (0.423) (0.391) 
w5_capx_s 0.535 0.546 
 (0.343) (0.344) 
Constant 2.233*** 2.265*** 
 (0.672) (0.704) 
   
Observations 708 708 
R-squared 0.179 0.190 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 10:  Tobin’s Q Regression Output for Bio-Medical Data with Urban Dummy 
Tobin’s Q is stepped forward one period with respect to all explanatory variables in each regression and winsorized 
at 5%.  Clust - dummy equals 1 if a firm is inside the cluster, the cluster for the Bio-Medical firms is the county 
Middlesex, MA.  Clust0 - dummy equals 1 if a firm is in clust or in the San Diego, CA cluster.  Clustcount - the 
number of firms in the observation’s cluster.  Logcount - this is the log of clustcount, a 0 value indicates the 
observation is the only one in that county.  Urb – dummy equal 1 if firm is urban.  W5_size - log of total assets 
winsorized at 5%.  W5_lev – leverage is given by total liabilities over total assets and winsorized at 5%.  
W5_ppent_s - net property, plant, and equipment adjusted for sizes by dividing by total assets and winsorized at 
5%.  W5_capx_s - capital expenditures adjusted for sizes by dividing by total assets and winsorized at 5%. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES F.w5_Q F.w5_Q F.w5_Q F.w5_Q 
     
clust -0.470**    
 (0.215)    
clust0  -0.426**   
  (0.182)   
clustcount   -0.0166**  
   (0.00709)  
logcount    -0.101 
    (0.0790) 
Urb -0.0349 -0.00364 0.0578 0.0297 
 (0.165) (0.169) (0.179) (0.197) 
w5_size 0.00443 0.00614 0.00745 0.00366 
 (0.0506) (0.0504) (0.0508) (0.0510) 
w5_lev -0.137 -0.166 -0.156 -0.151 
 (0.275) (0.279) (0.279) (0.279) 
w5_ppent_s -1.619*** -1.630*** -1.698*** -1.694*** 
 (0.567) (0.568) (0.567) (0.573) 
w5_xrd_s 3.245*** 3.263*** 3.291*** 3.291*** 
 (0.350) (0.349) (0.350) (0.352) 
rd_dummy 0.453* 0.458* 0.460* 0.434* 
 (0.235) (0.236) (0.236) (0.235) 
w5_capx_s 4.869*** 4.954*** 4.944*** 4.863*** 
 (1.612) (1.614) (1.609) (1.611) 
Constant 1.582*** 1.559*** 1.546*** 1.647*** 
 (0.557) (0.558) (0.560) (0.561) 
     
Observations 2378 2378 2377 2377 
R-squared 0.183 0.184 0.183 0.181 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 11:  Asset Growth Regression Output for Oil and Gas Extraction Data Urban Dummy 
Asset growth is winsorized at 5%.  Clustcount - the number of firms in the observation’s cluster.  Logcount - this is 
the log of clustcount, a 0 value indicates the observation is the only one in that county.  Localcom - dummy equals 
1 if there is at least one other firm in the county.  Clust1 - dummy equals 1 if there are 2 through 5 firms in the 
county.  Clust2 - dummy equals 1 if there are more than 5 firms in the county.  Urb – dummy equal 1 if firm is 
urban.  W5_size - log of total assets winsorized at 5%.  W5_lev – leverage is given by total liabilities over total 
assets and winsorized at 5%.  W5_ppent_s - net property, plant, and equipment adjusted for sizes by dividing by 
total assets and winsorized at 5%.  W5_capx_s - capital expenditures adjusted for sizes by dividing by total assets 
and winsorized at 5%.  IndQ - median Tobin’s Q for each NAICS. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES w5_growth w5_growth w5_growth w5_growth 
     
clustcount 0.00240**    
 (0.00111)    
logcount  0.0291***   
  (0.0110)   
localcom   0.0743**  
   (0.0367)  
clust1    0.0306 
    (0.0424) 
clust2    0.0963** 
    (0.0382) 
Urb -0.0296 -0.0222 -0.00147 -0.00545 
 (0.0341) (0.0309) (0.0291) (0.0289) 
w5_size -0.0113 -0.0122 -0.0124 -0.0127 
 (0.00860) (0.00847) (0.00845) (0.00837) 
w5_lev 0.0272 0.0362 0.0275 0.0410 
 (0.0769) (0.0772) (0.0777) (0.0770) 
w5_ppent_s 0.0445 0.0323 0.0404 0.0289 
 (0.0881) (0.0895) (0.0881) (0.0895) 
indQ 0.230 0.202 0.210 0.198 
 (0.319) (0.321) (0.316) (0.320) 
Constant -0.234 -0.209 -0.227 -0.218 
 (0.452) (0.452) (0.445) (0.450) 
     
Observations 778 778 778 778 
R-squared 0.114 0.118 0.114 0.120 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 12:  Asset Growth Regression Output for Bio-Medical Data  with Urban Dummy 
Asset growth is winsorized at 5%.  Localcom - dummy equals 1 if there is at least one other firm in the county.  
Clust1 - dummy equals 1 if there are 2 through 5 firms in the county.  Clust2 - dummy equals 1 if there are more 
than 5 firms in the county.  Urb – dummy equal 1 if firm is urban.  W5_size - log of total assets winsorized at 5%.  
W5_lev – leverage is given by total liabilities over total assets and winsorized at 5%.  W5_ppent_s - net property, 
plant, and equipment adjusted for sizes by dividing by total assets and winsorized at 5%.  W5_capx_s - capital 
expenditures adjusted for sizes by dividing by total assets and winsorized at 5%.  IndQ - median Tobin’s Q for each 
NAICS. 
 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES w5_growth w5_growth 
   
localcom -0.0383*  
 (0.0228)  
clust1  -0.0519** 
  (0.0242) 
clust2  -0.0151 
  (0.0259) 
Urb -0.00736 -0.0257 
 (0.0213) (0.0235) 
w5_size -0.00483 -0.00541 
 (0.00480) (0.00471) 
w5_lev 0.0472 0.0466 
 (0.0410) (0.0410) 
w5_ppent_s 0.147** 0.155** 
 (0.0617) (0.0625) 
w5_xrd_s 0.208*** 0.205*** 
 (0.0504) (0.0503) 
rd_dummy -0.0403 -0.0430 
 (0.0280) (0.0285) 
indQ 0.0434** 0.0436** 
 (0.0216) (0.0215) 
Constant -0.0365 -0.0271 
 (0.114) (0.115) 
   
Observations 2458 2458 
R-squared 0.062 0.064 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 13:  Tobin’s Q Regression Output for Oil and Gas Extraction Data with Distance Variables 
Tobin’s Q is stepped forward one period with respect to all explanatory variables in each regression and winsorized 
at 5%.  Localcom - dummy equals 1 if there is at least one other firm in the county.  Clust1 - dummy equals 1 if 
there are 2 through 5 firms in the county.  Clust2 - dummy equals 1 if there are more than 5 firms in the county.  
Ldist - log distance (in miles) to the nearest top 10 largest city.  Ldisthous - log distance (in miles) to center of 
Houston.  W5_size - log of total assets winsorized at 5%.  W5_lev – leverage is given by total liabilities over total 
assets and winsorized at 5%.  W5_ppent_s - net property, plant, and equipment adjusted for sizes by dividing by 
total assets and winsorized at 5%.  W5_capx_s - capital expenditures adjusted for sizes by dividing by total assets 
and winsorized at 5%. 
 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES F.w5_Q F.w5_Q 
   
localcom 0.379**  
 (0.184)  
clust1  0.535** 
  (0.238) 
clust2  0.171 
  (0.171) 
ldist 1.85e-05 0.00799 
 (0.0175) (0.0188) 
ldisthous 0.125 0.160 
 (0.102) (0.117) 
w5_size -0.114*** -0.106*** 
 (0.0371) (0.0367) 
w5_lev -0.153 -0.279 
 (0.312) (0.302) 
w5_ppent_s -0.181 -0.0582 
 (0.613) (0.538) 
w5_capx_s 0.355 0.333 
 (0.362) (0.376) 
Constant 1.510 1.303 
 (0.950) (1.027) 
   
Observations 486 486 
R-squared 0.214 0.236 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 14:  Tobin’s Q Regression Output for Bio-Medical Data with Distance Variables 
Tobin’s Q is stepped forward one period with respect to all explanatory variables in each regression and winsorized 
at 5%.  Clust - dummy equals 1 if a firm is inside the cluster, the cluster for the Bio-Medical firms is the county 
Middlesex, MA.  Clust0 - dummy equals 1 if a firm is in clust or in the San Diego, CA cluster.  Clustcount - the 
number of firms in the observation’s cluster.  Logcount - this is the log of clustcount, a 0 value indicates the 
observation is the only one in that county.  Ldist - log distance (in miles) to the nearest top 10 largest city.  
Ldisthous - log distance (in miles) to center of Boston.  W5_size - log of total assets winsorized at 5%.  W5_lev – 
leverage is given by total liabilities over total assets and winsorized at 5%.  W5_ppent_s - net property, plant, and 
equipment adjusted for sizes by dividing by total assets and winsorized at 5%.  W5_capx_s - capital expenditures 
adjusted for sizes by dividing by total assets and winsorized at 5%. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES F.w5_Q F.w5_Q F.w5_Q 
    
clust0 -0.343   
 (0.229)   
clustcount  -0.00931  
  (0.0107)  
logcount   -0.0300 
   (0.0870) 
ldist 0.0145 0.00793 0.00961 
 (0.0402) (0.0411) (0.0424) 
ldistbost 0.00275 0.00646 -0.000384 
 (0.0433) (0.0465) (0.0472) 
w5_size -0.00765 -0.00606 -0.00819 
 (0.0544) (0.0545) (0.0546) 
w5_lev -0.107 -0.0939 -0.0889 
 (0.298) (0.298) (0.297) 
w5_ppent_s -1.669*** -1.712*** -1.681*** 
 (0.605) (0.605) (0.607) 
w5_xrd_s 3.136*** 3.156*** 3.134*** 
 (0.369) (0.371) (0.373) 
rd_dummy 0.472** 0.477** 0.474** 
 (0.239) (0.240) (0.240) 
w5_capx_s 6.051*** 6.069*** 6.057*** 
 (1.651) (1.652) (1.653) 
Constant 1.629** 1.654*** 1.694*** 
 (0.638) (0.638) (0.640) 
    
Observations 2139 2138 2138 
R-squared 0.186 0.186 0.185 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 15:  Asset Growth Regression Output for Oil and Gas Extraction Data with Distance Variables 
Asset growth is winsorized at 5%.  Clustcount - the number of firms in the observation’s cluster.  Logcount - this is 
the log of clustcount, a 0 value indicates the observation is the only one in that county.  Localcom - dummy equals 
1 if there is at least one other firm in the county.  Clust1 - dummy equals 1 if there are 2 through 5 firms in the 
county.  Clust2 - dummy equals 1 if there are more than 5 firms in the county.  Ldist - log distance (in miles) to the 
nearest top 10 largest city.  Ldisthous - log distance (in miles) to center of Houston.  W5_size - log of total assets 
winsorized at 5%.  W5_lev – leverage is given by total liabilities over total assets and winsorized at 5%.  
W5_ppent_s - net property, plant, and equipment adjusted for sizes by dividing by total assets and winsorized at 
5%.  W5_capx_s - capital expenditures adjusted for sizes by dividing by total assets and winsorized at 5%.  IndQ - 
median Tobin’s Q for each NAICS. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES w5_growth w5_growth w5_growth w5_growth 
     
clustcount 0.00891**    
 (0.00376)    
logcount  0.0457**   
  (0.0189)   
localcom   0.0525  
   (0.0373)  
clust1    0.0123 
    (0.0398) 
clust2    0.0997** 
    (0.0442) 
ldist 0.00337 0.00375 0.00569 0.00415 
 (0.00471) (0.00472) (0.00512) (0.00449) 
ldisthous -0.0372** -0.0317* -0.0236 -0.0316* 
 (0.0185) (0.0176) (0.0171) (0.0178) 
w5_size 0.00385 0.00408 0.00624 0.00497 
 (0.00986) (0.00961) (0.00955) (0.00944) 
w5_lev 0.00337 0.00518 -0.0190 0.00905 
 (0.0891) (0.0894) (0.0890) (0.0886) 
w5_ppent_s -0.0236 -0.0250 0.00212 -0.0237 
 (0.111) (0.113) (0.113) (0.115) 
indQ 0 0 0 0 
 (0) (0) (0) (0) 
Constant 0.285* 0.242 0.191 0.235 
 (0.171) (0.162) (0.170) (0.165) 
     
Observations 541 541 541 541 
R-squared 0.122 0.122 0.111 0.123 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 16:  Asset Growth Regression Output for Bio-Medical Data with Distance Variables 
Asset growth is winsorized at 5%.  Localcom - dummy equals 1 if there is at least one other firm in the county.  
Clust1 - dummy equals 1 if there are 2 through 5 firms in the county.  Clust2 - dummy equals 1 if there are more 
than 5 firms in the county.  Ldist - log distance (in miles) to the nearest top 10 largest city.  Ldisthous - log distance 
(in miles) to center of Boston.  W5_size - log of total assets winsorized at 5%.  W5_lev – leverage is given by total 
liabilities over total assets and winsorized at 5%.  W5_ppent_s - net property, plant, and equipment adjusted for 
sizes by dividing by total assets and winsorized at 5%.  W5_capx_s - capital expenditures adjusted for sizes by 
dividing by total assets and winsorized at 5%.  IndQ - median Tobin’s Q for each NAICS. 
 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES w5_growth w5_growth 
   
localcom -0.0420*  
 (0.0221)  
clust1  -0.0559** 
  (0.0245) 
clust2  -0.0236 
  (0.0242) 
ldist 0.00493* 0.00621** 
 (0.00287) (0.00309) 
ldistbost -0.00560 -0.00758* 
 (0.00418) (0.00454) 
w5_size -0.00505 -0.00581 
 (0.00483) (0.00479) 
w5_lev 0.0273 0.0251 
 (0.0425) (0.0426) 
w5_ppent_s 0.180*** 0.191*** 
 (0.0642) (0.0656) 
w5_xrd_s 0.242*** 0.237*** 
 (0.0557) (0.0556) 
rd_dummy -0.0553* -0.0559* 
 (0.0286) (0.0291) 
indQ 0.0356 0.0363 
 (0.0221) (0.0220) 
Constant 0.0470 0.0518 
 (0.117) (0.118) 
   
Observations 2212 2212 
R-squared 0.062 0.064 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
